The victim says yes. The device says scam.
Coached-approval scams run on your customer's trust and the scammer's hardware. TrustSig Pro scores the device that starts the authentication against the account's own history, and blocks it before the push goes out.
- Device
- ent_4b90d2e1
- First seen
- 44 seconds ago
- Accounts tried, 7 days
- 9
- Network
- 620 km from every session
- Device
- the owner's phone
- First seen
- March 2025
- Sessions on account
- 312
- Network
- home provider, Tartu
Already in production
Publishing platforms, fintech and national charities across Europe already run TrustSig on their forms.
Everything is right except the machine
A coached-approval scam defeats credentials, MFA and the push dialog, because the person confirming is real. It cannot move the session onto the victim's hardware.
Scored on the device, before the push is sent
You send the initiation as one event, and the verdict comes back with its reasons before your confirmation goes out.
const e = await pro.submitEvent({ kind: "login", user_id: account.id, request_id: v.request_id,});
if (e.decision === "BLOCK") return deny(); // push never sentif (e.decision === "REVIEW") return hold(); // verify out of bandawait sendPushConfirmation(account);The spree ends part-way down the list
One scammer works a call list, and statistical memory turns each attempt into evidence against the next.
- A declined push is evidence: the owner saying no raises the device's risk on the next attempt.
- Blocks land on the scammer's hardware, so the victim's own phone and laptop keep working untouched.
- The device stays on the hotlist through fingerprint rewrites, caught by the same linkage that beats anti-detect browsers.
- Every attempt is logged with its reasons, one timeline per device, ready for your fraud team's case file.
- Accounts dialled
- 5 in 55 minutes
- Pushes after 14:31
- none sent
Put a verdict on the device that started the session.
Talk to an expertScams and social engineering, answered
TrustSig Pro scores the hardware and the statistics around the attempt. The account's history already knows which devices belong to its owner, and the scammer's machine is first-seen or known from other victims. Fan-out across accounts, entry cadence and network distance carry weight too.
A caller poses as your service, enters the victim's details into your real login, and your own system sends the confirmation push. The victim, still on the phone, is talked into approving. Credentials, MFA and the push all pass, because the only forged part is who holds the session.
Yes. You send the initiation as an event, and the verdict comes back with its reasons before you send the push. A blocked initiation means the customer never sees a push to be talked through.
A first-seen device on its own does not block, and known-good history carries negative weight. Blocks come from combinations: unknown hardware plus cross-account fan-out, scripted entry, or a device already tied to fraud. The ambiguous middle routes to REVIEW, where you verify through a channel a caller cannot script.
Yes. Repeated initiations against one account count as device velocity, and each push the owner declines raises the score of the next attempt.
A rewritten fingerprint links back to the hardware it left, through the same coherence and linkage evidence that catches anti-detect browsers. Behavioural memory holds for up to twelve months, so a device seen on one victim is still known on the next.
Ask the same platform a different question
Every page below runs on the same telemetry, the same device identity and the same detection catalog.
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